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Punitive Damages in Admiralty-
Analysis and Impact of Cedarville
Francis A. King*
0N MAY 7, 1965, THE GREAT LAKES ore carrier Cedarville col-
' lided with the motor vessel Topdalsfjord in a dense fog in
the Straits of Mackinac. The collision pierced the Cedarville's hull
and caused her to capsize some 40 minutes later with her full crew
aboard. As a result of the tragedy the Cedarville's owners' peti-
tioned2 to limit their liability to the amount prescribed by statute.3
Numerous claims, by injured seamen and representatives of de-
ceased seamen, all of which contained counts for punitive damages,
were joined in the action. The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio ultimately awarded punitive damages to
the claimants.
It is the purpose of this Comment to examine the court's reason-
ing and decision, prognosticate about its future effect, and to show
why the court should have denied punitive damages. The discus-
sion commences with an historical background of punitive damages
in maritime law and encompasses: (1) a detailed description of the
case itself; (2) an evaluation of the court's reasoning; and (3) a dis-
cussion of the effect of the decision on the maritime industry and (4)
of an insurer's liability for punitive damages.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Prior to the Cedarville case, a curious feature of United States
maritime law was that no recorded case had ever awarded punitive
damages against a shipowner or maritime corporation for the will-
ful, wanton, or criminal acts of the owner's servants or employees.
* THE AUTHOR: FRANCIS A. KING (B.A., Syracuse University; J.D., Case Western
Reserve University) practices law in Cleveland, Ohio, and serves, among other clients,
shippers' insurers. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of CHARLES R
SCHAEFER in the preparation of this article for publication.
I United States Steel Corporation was the owner of the Cedarville who would ulti-
mately be liable.
2 Petition of Den Norske Americaninje A/S for Exoneration From or Limitation of
Liability, 276 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (hereinafter cited as the Cedarville case].
a 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1964).
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This curious feature is completely contrary to the pattern of shore-
based law which has increasingly held that punitive damages may
be recovered against a corporation for .the willful and wanton acts
of its agents4 or against a master for the acts of his servant.5 The
decisions permitting punitive damages rely on one or the other of
two theories. The more strict of the two theories permits punitive
damages against a corporation for the acts of its agents in the same
manner, and to the same extent, that they would be recoverable
against the individual.( The reason given for this harsh rule is usu-
ally that a corporation can only act through its agents and there is no
reasonable or rational distinction between the recklessness, willful-
ness, or criminal action of the employee and that of the corpora-
tion.7 Under this strict view, a corporation is liable in punitive dam-
ages for acts done by its employees if such acts are within the scope
of their employment and if such acts would render the individual
liable for punitive damages, under similar circumstances.
Other courts, loath to cloak the corporation with full respon-
sibility for the willful or malicious acts of their employees, have
adopted a rule requiring participation, authorization, or ratification8
4 Much of this law has developed in suits brought against railroad corporations for
the willful and wanton or deliberate misconduct of their agents. See, e.g., Denver &
R.G. Ry. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597 (1887); Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489
(1875); Alabama G.S. Ry. v. Arnold, 80 Ala. 600, 2 So. 337 (1886); Central Pass. Ry.
v. Chatterson, 29 S.W. 18 (Ky. 1895).
The leading case is the Harris case which has been cited with approval numerous
times. E.g., Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffee, 366 F.2d 649, 662 (D.C. Cir.
1965); Hudson v. Louisville & N. Ry., 30 F.2d 391, 392 (5th Cir. 1929); Westre v.
Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 2 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1924); Winters v. Cowen, 90 F. 99, 102
(N.D. Ohio 1898), where exemplary damages were awarded to the plaintiff for his
being ejected from a train.
5 See generally C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 77
(1935).
6See, e.g., Kelite Prods., Inc. v. Binzel, 224 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1955); State Bank of
Waterloo v. Potosi Tie & Lumber Co., 299 Ill. App. 524, 20 N.E.2d 893 (1939); Binder
v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N.C. 512,23 S.E.2d 894 (1943).
7 Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Stratton, 131 Tenn. 620, 176 S.W. 105 (1915). See also
the interesting discussion by Mr. Justice Stone in Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell,
274 U.S. 112 (1927), where the Court upheld a state statute which assessed damages,
including punitive damages, on a corporation for the acts of a servant.
8 The tifying, authorizing, or participating, must be done by an individual au-
thorized to act or speak for the corporation. Although the range of acts constituting
ratification under this view is broad, the most common ground on which claimants at-
tempt to prove ratification is retention of the wrongdoer after the corporation has been
fully apprised of the facts. See Cobb v. Simon, 119 Wis. 597, 97 N.W. 276 (1903).
The same principle has been used to justify recovery of punitive damages against a
master, for the acts of his servant. See Rickelts v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 33 W. Va. 433,
10 S.E. 801 (1890); Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654 (1877). A number of
courts, however, refuse to hold as a matter of law that retention of the servant constitutes
ratification. See, e.g., Dillingham v. Anthony, 73 Tex. 47, 11 S.W. 139 (1889); Robin-
son v. Superior Rapid Transit Ry., 94 Wis. 345, 68 N.W. 961 (1896).
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by the corporation.9 Under either view, however, a corporation is
liable for punitive damages if it knowingly employs an incompetent,
negligent, or malicious employee,'0 or if the wrongful act is com-
mitted by some superior officer representing the corporation in its
corporate capacity." Although these landlocked concepts are well
established, they have not been applied to maritime fact situations.
Moreover, it appears that there have been few attempts to obtain
punitive damages against a maritime corporation for the willful and
wanton misconduct of servants aboard vessels.
One of the first reported American attempts to collect punitive
damages for a maritime tort was the case of The Amiable Nancy.'2
In that case a neutral Haitian schooner was captured by an American
privateer, aptly named The Scourge, and was willfully plundered by
the officers and crew of the commandeering vessel. Suit was
brought against the owner of The Scourge. The Court, discussing
the applicability of punitive damages, stated 'that the facts disclosed
a case of gross and wanton misconduct without any justification.
While the Court said that exemplary damages might be proper if the
action were against the original wrongdoers, it held that the owners
of the privateer were free from demerit and not liable for punitive
damages because they had "neither directed it, nor countenanced
it, nor participated in it in ,the slightest degree."'1 3 Thus, the Nancy
opinion clearly enunciated the milder maritime common law rule
that a shipowner is liable in punitive damages for his employees'
acts only if he authorized, ratified, or participated in the wrongful
act. The Amiable Nancy case appears to be the Supreme Court's
only pronouncement on the issue of punitive damages against ship-
9 Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893); Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Brewer, 56 App. D.C. 283, 12 F.2d 818 (1926); Curtis v. Siebrand Bros. Circus &
Carnival Co., 68 Idaho 285, 194 P.2d 281 (1948); Holland Furnace Co. v. Robson, 157
Colo. 347, 402 P.2d 628 (1965). Professor McCormick cites this as the majority rule
and the rule in federal courts as of the publication date, but states:
Neither the federal rule nor the rule of unrestricted liability can be said to be
logically superior one to the other. The situation presents a competition be-
tween the requirement of personal fault in exemplary damage cases and the
doctrine of the legal equivalence of the agent's act and the master's. The
solution should be reached on grounds of social and economic policy. C.
McCORMICK, supra note 5, at 284.
10 Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489 (1875); Central Georgia Ry. v.
Motes, 117 Ga. 923, 43 S.E. 990 (1903); Hansley v. Jamesville & W. Ry., 117 N.C.
565, 23 S.E. 443 (1895).
11 Denver & R.G. Ry. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597 (1887); Funk v. Kerbaugh, 222 Pa.
18, 70 A. 953 (1908).
12 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 546 (1818).
13 Id. at 559.
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owners. Moreover, only a few other federal or state cases have
raised the issue.
The earliest case appears to be Ralston v. The State's Rights14
in which the defendants were fighting a price-cutting war for pas-
senger service on the Delaware River with the libelant who owned
the Linnaeus. The master of the State's Rights, unable to destroy
his opponent by price cutting, engaged in an incredible practice of
deliberately ramming the Linneaus on three separate occasions
within a 1-month period. While the Pennsylvannia federal district
court said that "it is not legally correct ,to say that a court cannot give
exemplary damages ... against the owners of a vessel,"'15 it refused
to impose punitive damages upon the owners of the State's Rights
even though they were "inattentive to the manner in which the cap-
tain was using the authority they had committed to him,"'" and were
not absolutely ignorant (as was the case in The Amiable Nancy) of
the captain's actions. The court said that the owners were not "par-
ticularly informed" of the captain's actions and reiterated the
Amiable Nancy's holding that punitive damages cannot be awarded
against shipowners for the willful or intentional acts of their cap-
tain at sea, unless there is some conscious assent, ratification, or per-
sonal participation by the owners.
The only other case directly on point is Smyrna, Leippie & Phil-
adelphia Steamboat Co. v. Whilldin.17 There, the Delaware Su-
preme Court said that punitive damages could be recovered against a
ship owner for a willful collision deliberately caused by the master,
but no punitive damages were allowed on the facts of the case.' 8 It
is interesting to note that each of the aforementioned cases dealt
with deliberate acts by a master of a vessel, and that all three courts
refused to impute the master's malicious intent to the shipowner ab-
sent some act of ratification, assent, or participation by the owner.
The reluctance of the lower courts to award punitive damages
in admiralty cases is curious when viewed in the light of their readi-
ness to award punitive damages in railroad cases, even though they
are faced with the railroad equivalent of The Amiable Nancy in
14 20 F. Cas. 201 (E.D. Pa. 1836).
15Id. at 210.
16 Id.
17 4 Del. (4 Harv.) 228 (1845).
18 There was conflicting evidence as to whether or not the defendant's captain de-
liberately rammed the plaintiff's vessel to settle a dispute arising from wharfage space.
The court stated that punitive damages could be awarded for an intentional ramming as
well as for gross negligence. However, the jury returned a verdict for less than the
amount of compensatory damages claimed.
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Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway v. Prentice." In Lake
Shore the Supreme Court held that punitive damages can only be
awarded against a participant in the offense.20  Nevertheless, lower
federal courts have continued to impute liability to the railroads for
wanton, willful, or malicious acts of their servants.2 ' In the minds
of admiralty lawyers, however, the Lake Shore adherence to the
Amiable Nancy doctrine 22 seemed to settle the matter.
Only two cases since 1893 have contained an attempt to collect
punitive damages against a vessel owner for the actions of his ship
captain. Pacific Packing & Navigation Co. v. Fielding2 3 involved a
claim for punitive damages against the owner for wrongful impris-
onment by the ship's master. The claimant, faced with the pro-
nouncements in Lake Shore, apparently did not press the argument
that a corporation should automatically be liable for the acts of its
agent or that there had been ratification or authorization by the cor-
poration. Instead, he relied on another approach, approved in
Lake Shore, that a corporation would be liable without its consent if
the wrongdoer was sufficiently high in the corporate hierarchy so
that his wanton acts might be treated as the intent of the corporation
itself.'4 The Court in Pacific Packing, however, ruled that the prin-
19 147 U.S. 101 (1893). The Court in Lake Shore said that: "Although a principal
is liable in compensatory damages for an agent's act in the scope of employment, the
principal is not liable for exemplary damages merely because of the agent's wanton or
malicious intent." Id. at 107.
20 Id. at 107.
21 See cases cited in note 4 supra, especially the recent cases approving the doctrine
espoused in Denver & R.G. Ry. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597 (1887).
The Cedarville court attributes the confusion to some dicta in the Lake Shore case.
See 276 F. Supp. at 177, citing Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 109
(1893). The court goes on to state that this dicta has led courts and observers to reason
that since a corporation can act only through its agents, and therefore is responsible for
the acts of its agents, there need not be a ratification of the agent's misconduct to support
a finding against the corporate principal. 276 F. Supp. at 177.
Admitting that the language of Lake Shore is confusing, this writer can only con-
dude that the dicta mentioned in Cedarville was intended to apply to only compensatory
damages against the corporation, and not to the assessment of punitive damages. The
Lake Shore Court held that the corporation could only be liable for punitive damages if
it had somehow ratified or authorized the wrongful acts. 147 U.S. at 107-08, 112. A
full reading of the Lake Shore opinion establishes that this was the intent of the Court,
and that punitive damages can only be assessed against an actual wrongdoer, as opposed
to an innocent person in the position of respondent superior.
22The Court in Lake Shore expressed its approval of the doctrine enunciated in
The Amiable Nancy. Lake Shore & Michigan S. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 107-08
(1893).
23 136 F. 577 (9th Cir. 1905).
24 In Lake Shore the Court had stated:
The president and general manager, or... [other officer] actually wield-
ing the whole executive power of the corporation, may well be treated as so far
representing the corporation and identified with it that any wanton, malicious
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ciple of an elevated corporate official would not be extended to a
ship's master who, for the time, is in sole and absolute command of
the ship.25
The second case, Phillip v. United States Lines Co.,28 involved
substantially the same punitive damage questions as the Cedarville
case. The court, however, decided that the crew's acts, as a matter
of law, were not of such a willful and wanton character as to justify
an award of punitive damages;, it never reached the question of
whether punitive damages are recoverable 'under -the Jones Act or
whether a corporation is liable in punitive damages for the acts of
its agents when it has not participated in or, ratified the acts. Thus,
the vindication of vessel owners was all but complete. No puni-
tive damages could be -recovered against an owner for the acts of
the master, nor would the corporation be -liable except in -the highly
unlikely case where it could be held to have authorized, -ratified, or
participated in the acts of the tort-feasor.27
II. THE CEDARVILLE CASE
Onto these placid waters of maritime corporate security, the
Cedarville case burst with the impact of a tropical hurricane. The
only question presented in the Cedarville case was whether punitive
damages "may or ought tb be assessed."2 8 The district court, in
holding that punitive damages ought to be assessed ultimately,
found that the master of the Cedarville had been grossly negligent
up to the time of collision and that his negligent navigation was
dimmed in intensity only by his outrageous conduct in the 40 min-
utes which elapsed between the collision and the sinking of the ship.
The crucial facts leading to liability for punitive damages were, dis-
cussed in great detail by the court. 9
or oppressive intent of his, in doing wrongful acts in behalf of the corporation
to the injury of others, may be treated as the intent of the corporation -itself.
147 U.S. at 114.
25 136 F. at 580.
26 240 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
27 Accord Trabing v. California Navigation & Improvement Co., 121 Cal. 137, 53
P. 644 (1893). In Trabing the claimant alleged false imprisonment by a steamboat cap-
tain. The court cited Lake Shore and stated that the corporation was not liable for exem-
plary damages unless it had authorized or ratified the captain's acts. The court allowed
compensatory damages, however, in finding that the master of the vessel was the duly
authorized officer.
28276 F. Supp. at 166.
29 The district court itself did not hear any wimesses but permitted all counsel to read
whatever evidence it chose from the Coast Guard investigation and the depositions
taken. The fact that the Leading of the evidence took approximately 5 weeks testifies to
the voluminous amount of evidence before the court. See id. at 166-67.
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The court first examined the condition of the Cedarville and the
actions of its captain in the time immediately after the collision and
before the sinking of the vessel. The court found that the Cedar-
ville would "sink like a brick"3 ° if its hull were pierced and that in
the time following the collision and before the decision to attempt
beaching was made, the captain had sufficient opportunity to survey
the damage and should been concluded that the ship was incapable
of reaching a beach.31 Nevertheless, the captain refused to remove
the men from the ship even -though it could have been done with
complete safety, and he compounded his errors by deciding to beach
the vessel without knowing exactly where he was headed or how
long it would take to reach the nearest shore.3 The court took
a dim view of the captain's belated decision to attempt to beach the
vessel without evacuating the men and characterized his decision as
"an outrageous, indeed horrendous, act of misconduct .... .3 It
went on to say that the captain's "self-confessed gamble"34 to jeop-
ardize the lives of the crew members while attempting beaching was
a "willful, wanton act of misconduct of the worst order which
this court finds to be indefensible."3 5
The court next investigated the actions of the corporate officers
of the Bradley Fleet (a division of United States Steel) and found
that Captain Parrilla, manager of the Bradley Fleet, and Admiral
Khoury, a top ranking corporate officer, were in the Pittsburgh cor-
portate offices and were fully informed of the actions of the Cedar-
ville's captain, Martin Joppich, and his intent to attempt ,to beach the
vessel.36  It found that even though fully informed, these corporate
officers refused to contact the Cedarville's master in order to sway
30 Id. at 166. These were the words of Captain Parrilla, operating manager of the
United States Steel Fleet. The court also thought it important that the owners, fearing
the consequences of any collision had installed a "collision mat" which could be lowered
to cover any below-water opening in the hull in order to impede the flow of water into
the vessel. Id.
31 Id. at 170. The court found that the elapsed time between the collision and the
fateful decision was 17 minutes. Id.
32 The court found that another vessel, The Weissenhurg, was available with "its
lifeboats out... [and] the men could have been removed with virtually no danger either
by descending into the lifeboats or having the Weissenburg come alongside . Id.
33Id. at 163, 170.
34 Id. at 170.
35 Id. The court said that the captain "could have chosen to jeopardize his own life,
but he had no right to jeopardize the lives of others by failing to remove the crew before
embarking on the run for the beach." Id.
36 For a succinct summary concerning the privity and knowledge of the corporate of-
ficials, see id. at n.7.
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him from his suicidal plan.37 The court concluded that the failure to
contact the Cedarville was motivated solely by the corporate officers'
desire to limit the corporate liability and that by their silence the of-
ficials had ratified the wanton misconduct of the master, thus mak-
ing the corporation liable for punitive damages.3 8
The court, in arriving at its conclusion that punitive damages
could be assessed against United States Steel, had to overcome much
legal precedent. In the words of the court, the threshold legal
question was "whether punitive damages may ever be assessed in a
maritime proceeding."39  The court quickly answered this problem
in the affirmative, citing The Amiable Nancy" and Ralston v. The
State's Rights,41 along with dicta from several other cases.42
A second legal question considered by the court was whether the
Jones Ac&43 allows recovery for punitive damages. The court was
faced with a complete lack of precedent. The owners argued that
the Cedarville claimants should not be given punitive damages be-
cause the Jones Act, in providing statutory remedies unknown to the
common law, did not specifically provide for punitive damages and
because no Jones Act decision had ever granted punitive damages.
The court, unimpressed by this argument, reasoned that punitive
damages are an outgrowth of the common law and that in other
cases involving statutory violations such damages have been awarded
regardless of whether or not the statutes provided for them.4 4  The
37 Id. at 170.
3 8 See id.
39Id. at 171.
40 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818).
4120 F. Cas. 201 (E.D. Pa. 1836).
4 2 The court cited Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 47 N.Y. 282 (1872), a
non-admiralty state court lawsuit, for the proposition that exemplary damages are re-
coverable where the claim is based on culpable negligence; Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 363 (1851) (dictum) and Vaughan v. Atinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962) (dis-
senting opinion), both of which make general reference to the fact that exemplary
damages are a general rule of law recognizable in admiralty. However slim the case law
is, the few reported decisions do establish the existence of the right, although none of
them allowed the recovery of exemplary damages.
The court also alluded to the unique master-seamen relationship aboard vessels, and
the abject obedience seamen owe to their superior, without clearly explaining what part
this concept played in the rationale of the opinion. The court stated that "[i]n the mari-
time field ... there must be abject obedience to orders from the moment the seaman
enters service until his discharge." 276 F. Supp. at 172.
43 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
44 The court held that specific statutory authorization for punitive damages was
unnecessary and that exemplary damages have been permitted under federal statutes
which employ general language. 276 F. Supp. at 176, cting Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d
74 (3d Cir. 1965), a suit under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), and
Nagel v. Prescott, 36 F.R.D. 445 (N.D. Ohio 1964), a suit under the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-77aa (1964).
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court supported its holding by comparing the Federal Employer's
Liability Act45 (FELA) to the Jones Act,4 implying that FELA de-
cisions would control the Cedarville case, and citing Ennis v. Yazoo
& M.V. Railway47 and Cain v. Southern Railway8 for the proposi-
tion that exemplary damages may be recovered in a death action in-
stituted under the FELA.
The main thrust of the court's opinion, however, dealt with the
liability of United States Steel for the acts of its servant, the Cedar-
ville's captain, Martin Joppich. Although the court characterized
Captain Joppich's actions as "horrendous misconduct,"49 it still had
to choose between -the -two rules of corporate liability: 0 (1) the rule
that a corporation can act only through its agents and is liable for
punitive damages if the agent would be liable,5' and (2) the rule
that a corporation is liable in punitive damages only if it has au-
thorized, ratified, or participated in the misconduct of its agents.2
4545 U.S.C. § 51 (1964).
46 The Jones Act is virtually a carbon copy of the FELA and extends FELA remedies
to seamen.
47 118 Miss. 509, 79 So. 73 (1918). This case is an anomaly. The court stated that
under the facts there was no error in instructing the jury that punitive damages could be
recovered for willful and wanton acts of misconduct committed by the railroad em-
ployees. However, this point appears to have been decided under state law, not under
the FELA. No authorities are cited, and it is unclear from a reading of the case whether
the claim was for damages under the FELA or for common-law negligence. There were
two trials in the case, the first verdict of $13,000 being set aside, and a subsequent ver-
dict of $5,000 being entered. The first case included the disputed instruction on puni-
tive damages. The court affirmed this, and dismissed without opinion what it deemed to
be the second question in the case, namely, whether the court erred in instructing the jury
in the second case that damages should be limited to those recoverable under the FELA.
Thus, the case probably was not decided under the FELA at all, and it is intimated that in
the second trial the court limited the damages to those recoverable under the FELA,
which probably did not include punitive damages.
48 199 F. 211 (E.D. Tenn. 1911). The case said only that there was no survival of
action under the 1908 act until the 1910 amendment which provided a measure of dam-
ages for survival. However, the court did not say that punitive damages are recover-
able in a survivor's action after 1910; the only inference that this is so follows from the
court's statement that:
I also think it clear under the Act of 1908, before the amendment of 1910,
in an action brought for the statutory beneficiaries to recover damages for the
death of an employee the recovery is limited to the pecuniary injury or loss sus-
tained by the beneficiaries from the death of the deceased, and that the meas-
ure of damages is cornpensation for the loss of such pecuniary benefit as could
have been reasonably expected to the beneficiaries, as of legal right or other-
wise, from the continued life of the deceased, excluding all consideration of
punitive elements, loss of society, wounded feelings of the survivors and suf-
ferings of the deceased. Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
49 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
50 See generally text accompanying notes 6-11 supra.
5 1 See notes 6-7 supra & accompanying text.
52 See notes 8-9 supra & accompanying text.
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The court, recognizing 'the constraints of stare decisis, decided to fol-
low the less harsh ratification rule as enunciated in Lake Shore &
Michigan Southern Railway v. Prentice."' Undaunted by its self-
imposed restraint, the court went oa to assess punitive damages
against United States Steel using a two-pronged argument.
The court held that the corporate officers of the Bradley Fleet,
aware of the Cedarville's plight, had, by their inaction and silence,
ratified both Captain Joppich's decision to beach the vessel and his
subsequent misconduct.- The court reasoned that when the of-
ficials' knowledge of the collision, the hole in the Cedarville's outer
shell, the quantities of water being taken on by the ship, and the
fact that the Cedarville would "sink like a brick"55 if her outer shell
were pierced was coupled with inaction by the corporate officials the
result was to ratify the wrongful acts of Captain Joppich.58
After concluding that the corporation had ratified the acts of
Captain Joppich, the court alternatively held that the captain was
so high in the affairs of the corporation, so completely in charge of
the vessel, and so unfettered in his authority, that his acts would
have made the corporation liable in punitive damages without any
act of ratification.5 7  The court, said that "'t~he record clearly dis-
closes that in -the operation of the vessel Captain Joppich had no
superior, was subordinate to no higher corporate officer, so that his
actions were tantamount to those of the board of directors."5 " In
arriving at this latter conclusion, the court repudiated sub silentio
the Pacific Packing doctrine59 that a master is not an official whose
acts render the corporation liable for punitive damages.
III. CEDARVILLE IN RETROSPECT
THE COURT'S RATIONALE
The trial court's conclusion that the absence of punitive damages
53 147 U.S. 101 (1893).
54 276 F. Supp. at 169. The court said that the situation was known to the officials
and "cried out for an immediate evacuation of the entire crew. With the Cedarville at
anchor for fifteen minutes, and the Weissenburg standing by to rescue the crew... cir-
cumstances were most appropriate for disembarking the crew immediately after the col-
lision." Id. at 180. The court next severely criticized the officials' silence and said:
"It is ironic that this silence - undoubtedly motivated by a desire to incur the favor of
the limitation statutes and thus reduce or contain the legal ramification of the collision
-now operates to expose the petitioner to a far greater liability." Id. at 181.
55Id. at 179. See also note 30 supra & accompanying text.
56 276 F. Supp. at 179.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Pacific Packing & Navigation Co. v. Fielding, 136 F. 577 (9th Cir. 1905). See
also notes 23-25 supra & accompanying text.
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in previous maritime cases should not bar such damages in the
Cedarville case seems eminently correct. The mere fact that a cer-
tain facet of the law has never been applied to a particular industry
is not a good reason for failing 'to apply it where the facts warrant
its application. As the few cases dealing with the question have il-
lustrated, no court has ever held or contended that punitive damages
could not be assessed against a shipowner. Courts have merely re-
fused to assess such damages in the few cases in which they were
sought. Nor is there any logical reason why the maritime industry
should be exempt from punitive damages, where the facts warrant
their imposition. The curious paucity of punitive damage claims in
admiralty indicates, at best, a notable restraint of counsel in favor
of the maritime industry.
The second question decided by the court, whether punitive dam-
ages can be assessed under the Jones Act, is not disposed of so easily.
Since the Jones Act incorporates the FELA by reference and extends
FELA remedies to seamen, courts have held that the measure of
damages is the same under both acts.60 The same courts have held
that the measure of damages in FELA wrongful death actions is the
deprivation of the pecuniary benefits which the beneficiary of the
deceased might have received had the deceased not expired from his
injuries. 61 Punitive damages are generally not recoverable. 2
While this measure of damages reflects the general rule as to ac-
tions brought directly by surviving railroad employees or seamen,
and probably the rule as to actions brought for the benefit of a de-
ceased employee's surviving widow, husband, or children, it would
appear to be an open question whether this rule applies to survival
actions brought by a deceased seaman's representative for the de-
ceased's pain and suffering prior to his demise. Most courts have
held that in actions brought under statutes patterned after Lord
Campbell's Act 63 (which include FELA, Jones Act, and most state
wrongful death statutes) punitive damages are not an element
which the court or jury may consider, unless the act expressly or by
dear implication confers the right to such damages." These wrong-
6 0 See, e.g., Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342 (1936); Martin v. Atlantic
Coast Line Ry., 268 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1959); Jensen v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 24 Ii. 2d 383,
182 N.E.2d 211 (1961); Moore v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 28 I1. App. 2d 340, 171
N.E.2d 393 (1961).
61 Id.
62 See generally Annor., 70 A.L.R.2d 568, § 5(a) (1961).
63 Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93.
64 See generally 43 A.L.R.2d 1291 (1955); 94 A.L.R. 386 (1935). See also Kern v.
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ful death actions, based on the idea that beneficiaries can recover
damages for their pecuniary loss, exclude any liability for punitive
damages, even where aggravating circumstances would warrant them
in an action between the injured person and the one inflicting the
injury.'5 On the other hand, a few recent decisions under state
wrongful death statutes -have sustained the recovery of punitive
damages under the survival portion of the statute.66
It was the survival theory which the Cedarville court used to sup-
port its determination that punitive damages were recoverable under
the Jones Act. After tracing the history of the FELA and the Jones
Act, the court stated:
[Tjhese men... stand at bar to demand all that the law extends
to their more fortunate fellows who survived. 67
The court is constrained . .. to find that under the Jones Act
the right of a deceased seaman to sue his employer for punitive
damages survives the seaman's death.68
In the present disorganized status of the law it cannot be said that
the court's decision to base the recovery of punitive damages on the
survival aspects of the Jones Act was harsh, arbitrary, or unwar-
ranted in law. While the FELA and Jones Act cases have generally
limited damages to the beneficiaries' pecuniary loss plus an award
for the deceased's conscious pain and suffering,69 no Jones Act case
to date has specifically dealt with the question of exemplary or puni-
tive damages. 70
One can, however, criticize the court for seemingly ignoring
some legal principles in reaching its decision. While it was a close
factual question as to whether or not the 10 seamen died instan-
taneously, recovery under the survival portion of the Jones Act re-
Kogan, 93 N.J. Super. 459, 226 A.2d 186 (1967), which discusses state case law prece-
dents and statutes which are analogous to the language and case law precedents of FELA.
65 Florida E. Coast Ry. v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 149 So. 631 (1933); Mathies v.
Kittrell, 350 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1960).
66 Reynolds v. Willis, 209 A.2d 760 (Del. 1965); Connolly v. Palm Aire Country
Club, Inc., 26 Fla. Supp. 17 (Cir. Ct. 1965).
67 276 F. Supp. at 175, quoting Pimenta v. Marine Navigation Co., 258 F. Supp. 666
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
68276 F. Supp. at 176.
69 See, e.g., Ridgedell v. Olympic Towing Corp., 205 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. La. 1962);
Correia v. Van Camp Sea Food Co., 113 Cal. App. 2d 71, 248 P.2d 81 (1952). See also
the extended discussion of damages in Petition of Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A.,
248 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
70 There is some case law supporting the theory that punitive damages are recover-
able under the FELA. Ennis v. Yazoo & M.V. Ry., 118 Miss. 509, 79 So. 73 (1918).
For a discussion of the dubious reliability of this precedent, see note 47 supra.
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quires that there be some conscious pain and suffering on the part
of the decedent7 In addition the right to compensatory damages is
generally a condition precedent to the recovery of punitive dam-
ages.7' Thus the court failed to show how compensatory damages
could be awarded under the survival portion of the Jones Act with-
out a finding of conscious pain and suffering and failed to explain
how punitive damages could be given without establishing a right
to compensatory damages. Even conceding a growing body of law
which makes punitive damages independent from compensatory
damages, 3 the court still failed to discuss whether or not this emerg-
ing view is applicable to maritime law.
Allowance of punitive damages by the Cedarville court produces
the illogical result that these damages may be recovered under the
survival portion of the Jones Act while under the cases to date they
apparently cannot be recovered either by a seaman who survives the
tortious act 4 or by a deceased seaman's representatives suing for
his wrongful death. Perhaps the only satisfactory explanation is the
Cedarville court's observation that punitive damages are a creature
of the common law and are not precluded simply because the statute
71 Davis v. Parkhill-Goodloe Co., 302 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962); Gardner v. Na-
tional Bulk Carriers, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Va. 1963), aff'd, 333 F.2d 676 (4th
Cir. 1964).
7 2 See the extensive discussion of this rule in Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 527 (1951), and
cases cited therein. As the annotation points out, this is now a "majority rule," but there
is a growing body of case law supporting the propostion that exemplary damages are an
independent theory of recovery, and recovery is not dependent on the allowance of com-
pensatory or nominal damages.
There is also one strong court opinion that under federal common law (which pre-
sumably would control Jones Act punitive damages cases) that the allowance of exem-
plary damages is not dependent on a finding of compensatory damages. Basista v. Weir,
340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965). In actions to recover punitive treble damages under federal
antitrust acts, however, the courts have held that a showing of actual damages is essential.
Freedmen v. Philadelphia Terminals Auction Co., 197 F. Supp. 849 (E.D. Pa. 1961);
Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 184 F. Supp. 440 (E.D.
Pa. 1960).
73 It is questionable whether the case law fashioned under the Jones Act would allow
an award for conscious pain and suffering absent some proof of how the seamen met
their deaths. See cases cited note 71 supra. However, other cases have allowed awards
for conscious pain and suffering where death was attributable to drowning. Grantam
v. Quinn Menhaden Fisheries, Inc, 344 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1965); Petition of Marina
Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 248 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), modified on other
grounds, 364 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005, rehearing denied,
386 U.S. 929 (1967). But, can it be assumed that the Cedarville crewmen met their
deaths by drowning? Although the ship capsized, and although drowning is the most
readily suggested theory of death, it could not be proved that the seamen were not
crushed to death, killed by flying debris, flung against the bulwarks, or even electrocuted.
74 See note 69 supra & accompanying text. Obviously if the injured man is alive he
cannot take advantage of the Cedarville holding allowing punitive damages under the
survival portion of the Jones Act.
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does not allude to them. 5 This observation, however, overlooks
the majority rule in death cases that punitive damages cannot be re-
covered unless the statute specifically authorizes them.76 The court's
analogy to recovery of punitive damages under the Securities and
Civil Rights Acts77 is not very persuasive in view of its failure to
mention this majority rule in more comparable death and personal
injury statutes.
The most important question in the Cedarville case, however,
was whether United States Steel was liable in punitive damages for
the acts of Captain Joppich. Had the Cedarville represented a sim-
ple choice between the rule of automatic corporate liability and the
rule requiring ratification, the maritime industry, although appalled
at the choice, could probably advance little logic supporting the
contrary position. The court, however, chose to base its decision on
a finding of ratification; but the court's method of finding ratifica-
tion by the corporate officers is not only contrary to all judicial
precedent in the maritime field, but also opens the door to the most
widespread legal consequences.
Traditionally courts, in the aftermath of maritime disasters, have
been loath to cloak themselves in the garb of experts or to scrutinize
or second-guess the acts of a captain at sea in light of what subse-
quent events show he should have done. The courts have reasoned
that safe navigation requires that the commanding officer of a mer-
chant vessel must be free to exercise his own judgment and that
academic discussions employing experts and 20-20 hindsight serve
no useful purpose.78 The courts have found it imperative to tread
cautiously, give due consideration to the elements of danger, excite-
ment, and confusion, and to ultimately hold that the actions of ships'
masters "should be judged on the basis of what another navigator at
the time would have done under similar circumstances." 79
75 276 F. Supp. at 176.
76 See generally Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1291 (1955); Annot., 94 A.L.L 386-96
(1935).
77 276 F. Supp. at 176.
78 See The Lusitania, 251 F. 715, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1918). See also the court's com-
ment in The Maurice R. Shaw, 46 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Me. 1942), citing The Lusitania
and saying that "[tjhe Court will seldom question the wisdom of a shipmaster in making
his decision as to the proper handling of his vessel. The cases on that point are numer-
ous." Id. at 769.
70 Kelly Island Lime & Transp. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 47 F. Supp. 533, 543 (N.D.
Ohio 1942). The courts' dilemma was succinctly stated by one typical court:
The problem confronting him [the master] was a problem of the sea,
solved ... by seafaring men. We should not view the situation in retrospect or
from the shore, but from the viewpoint of the master on the bridge of the crip-
pled ship, charged with full responsibility for her safety and for the safety of
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The courts, while refraining from second-guessing masters of
vessels confronted with emergencies and while zealously defending
the right of masters to make their own decisions, have rarely discussed
the question of owners' liability for their masters' acts in connection
with punitive damages. The question of owners' responsibility for
the acts of a master has arisen most often in the context of an own-
er's petition to limit liability. In the cases to limit liability the courts
have been adamant in proclaiming that "[tihe master is the com-
mander of the ship.., a master in every sense of the word"'8 and that
in making decisions he "must be left free to exercise his own judg-
ment ....,81
The same courts have rejected the contention that owners or
agents on the shore should have control over the master of a vessel
in an emergency, saying that a managing agent would not be jus-
tified in directing a captain's actions because such direction would
divest a captain "of that discretion which the law confers upon the
master in emergencies . '...82 Another court has expressed the
opinion that even if the vessel owner were on the bridge, he would
have no authority to assume command of a ship from the master in
an emergency.83  The most recent and candid pronouncement con-
cerning a master's discretion was in the case of Saskatchewan Gov-
ernment Insurance Office v. Spot Pack, Inc., 4 where the court said
her cargo and crew; and, when viewed in that light, we must not only be able
to say that the course pursued was wrong, but we be further able to say that it
was so illy considered and so plainly wrong that a competent navigator would
have rejected it, if placed in the like position. The Walter A. Luchenbach, 14
F.2d 100 (9th Cit. 1926).
The most stirring example of the freedom the courts give to ship captains is the case of
The Princess Sophia, 61 F.2d 339 (9th Cit. 1932). The ship became stranded on an
Alaskan reef during a storm. Although rescue ships were standing by, Captain Locke
thought that the vessel was in no immediate danger and decided to await more favorable
weather before removing the passengers and crew. As the fury of the storm increased,
the Sophia was driven across the reef and destroyed, and 350 lives were lost. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said that under the law of the sea Captain Locke's judg-
ment was final and that he had done what he believed was the best for all concerned.
See id. at 350. See also Federal Ins. Co. v. S.S. Royalton, 328 F.2d 515, 517-18 (6th
Cir. 1964), where the court frowned upon an expert academician's opinion as to the time
it would take a ship to sink, when the academician had never applied his theories.
80 United Geophysical Co. v. Vela, 231 F.2d 816, 819 (5th Cir. 1956), quoting The
Balsa, 10 F.2d 408, 409 (3d Cir. 1926).
81231 F.2d 819, quoting The Lusitania, 251 F. 715, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
82The Princess Sophia, 61 F.2d 339, 352 (9th Cit. 1932) (dictum).
83 The North Star, 3 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Mass. 1925). The judge was emphatic and
said that "I doubt whether an owner on the bridge would have any right to give an order
against the master's; there cannot be two captains on the same vessel." Id. at 1011 (em-
phasis added).
84 242 F.2d 385 (5th Cit. 1957).
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that although the "marvels of science - the telephone, radio, easy
access by airplane -"I" make the idea of navigating and managing
a vessel from a swivel chair alluring, such a decision, by a court
which succumbs -to the paternalistic plea that an owner ought to
have checked to see if a ship's captain was acting properly, would
undermine a master's complete authority and reduce a competent
captain "to an inferior, subordinate functionary." '86
The judicial pronouncements concerning decisions of a master
confronted with an emergency are numerous. The point is that the
courts have recognized that a normally competent master of a
stricken vessel is not, and should not, be held to the strict standard
of a reasonably prudent man to make the correct decision at all
times. Further, it is a recognition that the master, -through experi-
ence, demonstrated ability, and actual presence at the scene, is the
one human being who is most capable of making the correct deci-
sion, and that in doing so his judgment should be unfettered.
In light of these judicial pronouncements," the Cedarville court's
reasoning that silence on the part of the United States Steel officials
amounted to a ratification of Captain Joppich's conduct, seems
clearly erroneous and unreasonable. The court, in finding that Cap-
tain Parrilla's silence amounted to ratification, relied on his admis-
sion that the Cedarville would "sink like a brick" if holed" and the
information which he received in Pittsburgh on the date of the col-
lision. 9 It might reasonably be asked, what could Parrilla have
done if he had contacted Captain Joppich? He could not reason-
ably have surmised through a long-distance conversation at the
height of an emergency that Captain Joppich, a hitherto reliable
master with long experience, was going to pieces in the emergency.
The mere fact that Joppich was headed for the beach indicates that
he thought he could make it. He assuredly would have relayed his
opinion to Parrilla. Moreover, if Joppich did not know where his
ship was in relation to the shore, Parrilla certainly could not have
known. While Parrilla could have wasted critical minutes trying
to ascertain the exact situation via long-distance telephone or taken
over command of the ship and given orders to the master and crew
concerning a critical situation about which he could know little, it is
more reasonable to conclude that even if Parrilla had contacted the
851d. at 390.
86 Id.
87 See notes 80-86 supra & accompanying text.
88276 F. Supp. at 179.
89 Id. at 184.
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ship, he would have left the safety of the vessel and her crew to the
judgment of the man most able to handle it - the man on the scene.
Captain Parrilla, then, had three choices: (1) He could have
contacted the Cedarville and, after ascertaining the situation as best
he could from Captain Joppich, concurred in the latter's decision
to beach the vessel. (2) He could have remained silent and left the
Captain of the vessel to extricate himself from the peril. (3) He
could have contacted the vessel and made the decision which events
subsequently showed should have been made - abandon ship! The
second decision incurred liability in the Cedarville case. The first
would undoubtedly have incurred liability on the basis of clear-cut
ratification. Only if Parrilla had made the right decision - to
abandon ship - would the corporation have escaped liability for
punitive damages.
This is an awesome responsibility to place on the shoulders of a
man far removed from the scene. A shore-based and uninformed
corporate official could not possibly know that his decision to coun-
termand the judgment of his captain would decrease the peril to
crew and vessel. The Cedarville decision, if allowed to stand on its
present rationale, will result in divided authority at the very time
when unified command is most needed - during a crisis at sea. The
spectre is raised of panicky corporate officials issuing orders counter-
manding the judgment of competent masters at sea, resulting in
deaths and disaster which might otherwise be avoided. It might be
well to ask the passengers and crew of a vessel in dire straits
whether they would rather trust their safety to the master or to a dis-
tant, shore-based corporate official. In nine cases out of ten, the
master's decision will probably be correct under the circumstances.
The tenth situation should not be allowed to make or control the
law.
Curiously enough, while condemning the silence of the corpor-
ate officials, the court relied on the proposition that a master is al-
ways in complete control of his ship and crew to support its alter-
nate reasoning for awarding punitive damages against the owner for
the master's wrongful acts." It referred to the seaman's contract as
"a singular exception to the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition
90 Earlier the court had held that the captain was so high in the corporate hierarchy
that his actions constituted actions of the board of directors. See text accompanying
note 57 supra. If the captain's actions were really tantamount to a board of directors'
resolution, it is hard to see how any corporate official could countermand the captain's
orders.
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against involuntary servitude,"91 and likened the master's position to
that of "legal guardian"92 of the crew members. It further said that
in all of seafaring history:
[TJhe relationship of master to seaman has been entirely different
from that of employer to employee on land. The lives of passen-
gers and crew, as well as the safety of ship and cargo, are entrusted
to the master's care. Every one and everything depend on him.
He must command and the crew must obey. Authority cannot be
divided. These are actualities which the law has always recog-
nized.93
While the court relied on this quotation as an illustration of the
master's duty to his crew, it failed to acknowledge that the master's
authority is a double-edged sword. If authority cannot be divided
between master and crew, it is hard to comprehend how it can be
divided between master and owner at the time of a crisis. If the
master's authority is complete, the owner cannot intercede for him.
The court's opinion presents the master's authority as a one-way
street, binding on the crew, but subject to revocation by his superiors
at the first hint of a disaster. It is respectfully suggested that, at
least in moments of crisis, this view is wrong.
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF CEDARVILLE
THE MARITIME INDUSTRY'S FAVORED ROLE IN HISTORY
The maritime industry has long enjoyed favored treatment as il-
lustrated by the Limitation of Liability Act94 and certain provisions
of the Carriage of Goods by Sea At,95 which are no less potent
today than they were in 1851, when Congress passed the Limita-
tion Act. Despite these congressional attempts to encourage the in-
dustry, it has continued to decline, and could now be classified as
one of the sick industries of American commerce. Federal subsi-
dizing of many ocean fleets is the order of the day with many more
fleets clamoring for similar help.
In an attempt to encourage the industry the Limitation of Liabil-
ity Act, in substance, provides that a vessel owner may limit his lia-
bility to the value of the vessel and her freights pending, following
a maritime disaster, absent any privity or knowledge on -the part of
the owner.9 6 This has been held to mean that for limitation pur-
91376 F. Supp. at 172.
921d.
o3Id. at 171-72, citing Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 38 (1942).
o446 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1964).
95 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1964).
09The actual operational language of the limitation principle is as follows:
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poses a vessel owner is not responsible for acts of negligence or
misconduct by the master or crew which cause the disaster provided
he had no knowledge of the dangerous practice or opportunity to
correct it; but the owner is liable if he had knowledge that the ship
was unseaworthy in any respect and the unseaworthiness contributed
to the disaster . 7 In the former case, the owner may limit his liabil-
ity; in the latter, he may not."' By judicial decision, the limitation
fund is the value of the vessel and freights at the close of the voy-
age in question9 and does not include proceeds of insurance pay-
able to the owner after the disaster. °°
The legislators who passed and have since modified this statute
were fully aware that maritime accidents could result in horrendous
disasters unparalleled in any other industry.' 01 It was to prevent
the bankruptcy of shipowners in such situations, and to encourage
the shipping industry, that the Limitation Act was passed. 02  While
the Act, in maritime disasters, results in great hardship to both the
injured seamen and the estates of deceased seamen since the limita-
tion fund is rarely sufficient to satisfy even a fraction of these
claims, a choice had to be made, and Congress favored the ship-
owner and the promotion of maritime commerce. A similar provi-
sion in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) 10 3 exempts
The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign, for
any embezzlement, loss, or destruction by any person of any property, goods,
or merchandise shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any loss, dam-
age, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or
forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of
such owner or owners, shall not, except in the cases provided for in subsection
(b) of this section, exceed the amount of value of the interest of such owner
in such vessel, and her freight then pending. 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1964).
97 See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY 695-706 (1967), for an
excellent discussion of privity or knowledge of the corporate shipowner. As the authors
point out, the owner's responsibility is not limited to providing a seaworthy vessel, but
includes such duties as the selection of competent officers and personnel. If the owner
has knowledge of improper procedures followed by the master and crew at sea, he loses
his right to limit liability. In cases involving loss of life, the 1935 amendment to the
Limitation Act provides that privity or knowledge of the master at or prior to the com-
mencement of the voyage is conclusively deemed to be that of the owner of the vessel.
46 U.S.C. § 183(e) (1964).
9 8 See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 97, at 696.
99 Norwich & Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. 104 (1871).
100 The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468 (1886).
101 The only significant amendment to the Limitation Act reflects the disfavor into
which it has fallen with modern courts and legislators. In 1935, the Act was amended to
provide that in cases of loss of life or bodily injury, the portion of the limitation fund
which was applicable to such claims would be increased to an amount equal to $60 per
ton of the vessel's gross tonnage. 46 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1964).
102 See, e.g., British Transp. Comm'n v. United States, 354 U.S. 129 (1957).
103 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1964).
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owners from any liability to cargo interests for loss at sea, absent
privity or knowledge, or unseaworthiness of which the owner was
aware, at the time of shipment. Thus, if the loss of cargo at sea is
attributable only to the negligence or bad seamanship of the mas-
ter or crew, the shipowner is not liable to the cargo interests. This
simplified rendition of the Limitation Act and COGSA does not be-
gin to describe all the loopholes and limitations of the two Acts.
However, it does serve to illustrate the favored treatment which
Congress has occasionally given to the maritime industry.
Admittedly, the limitation principle has lost favor with the
courts in recent years, and is now undergoing heavy attack in the
halls of Congress. One reason is probably congressional failure to
adopt a more enlightened view toward increasing the limitation
fund based on a tonnage factor. This concept, reflected in the
Brussels Maritime Convention of 1957,"°4 has heretofore been re-
jected by Congress.
Nevertheless, the Limitation Act has been a major bulwark to
American shipping interests, and has reassured individual ship-
ping companies that they cannot be forced into bankruptcy by dam-
age and liability claims resulting from maritime disasters, unless the
company itself was privy to the negligence involved. The removal
of this bulwark would be a major blow to the industry. To go fur-
ther, and inflict punitive damages on -the corporation for its failure
to take affirmative action and wrench control from the master in a
crisis, would be a crippling blow that the industry might not sur-
vive. It is in this context that the Cedarville case represents a great
threat to shipping interests. It is one thing to subject a corporation
to liability, and to deny the benefits of the Limitation Act, when a
corporation knows of a defect in a vessel or a dangerous practice
and fails to take affirmative action. It is quite another to go several
steps further and heap punitive damages on its head for failure to
correct a defective captain when past experience indicated that it
had every right to rely on his judgment.
There is yet another dangerous aspect to the Cedarville ratio-
nale. If the acts of a master at sea are truly tantamount to those of
the "board of directors," then judicial interpretation has rendered
104 Although the United States participated in all the proceedings, it never ratified
the Brussels Convention. It was brought before Congress in 1961. S. 2314, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). The issue was again raised in 1963. S. 556, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1963). Basically, the convention calls for limitation of property claims based on a
value of $67 per ton, and for limitation of personal injury claims based on $207 per ton
of the vessel's tonnage.
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the Limitation Act a dead letter and no congressional repeal is neces-
sary for its demise. The Act provides that no vessel owner may
limit liability against loss or damage when he had personal knowl-
edge of the condition which ultimately caused the loss. If the mas-
ter's acts are those of -the corporation, then his negligence and
faulty seamanship are also attributable to the corporation, and courts
which -have granted limitation for almost a century will suddenly be
proved wrong. Absolute liability, in the true sense of the word, will
have arrived.
It is interesting to note that in Cedarville the owner's petition to
limit liability had already been dismissed at the time of the hear-
ings on punitive damages. Thus, the punitive award was com-
pletely unnecessary to fully compensate the damage to claimants
and the estates of the deceased seamen because full recovery was al-
ready guaranteed.
V. LIABILITY OF INSURERS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
If the Cedarville rationale is affirmed, one question which will
soon be raised is whether or not insurance underwriters are liable for
punitive damages under the standard marine insurance policies cur-
rently in use. The usual "Protection and Indemnity" policy, which
covers injuries and death to seamen, does not mention punitive
damages. Since there is no precedent in the maritime field, analogy
can only be made to other areas of the law which have considered
the insurer's liability for punitive damages. As might be expected,
the automobile field has laid the cornerstone of the law on this
question, even though some scattered cases have been decided from
other areas of insurance, notably malpractice insurance.
The insurer's initial defense is that public policy forbids the im-
position of punitive damages. The argument, in its various forms,
proceeds: punitive damages are not compensation to the injured
party, but are a fine levied against the wrongdoer for the benefit of
the public in order to prevent recurrence of the wrongful act. If the
damages can be passed along to an insurer, there is no deterrent
value against the wrongdoer, excepting the minor one - insurance
cancellation or increased rates. Furthermore, the public, for whose
benefit the damages are levied, is in reality the ultimate victim,
because the insurer will pass its loss on to the public in the form of
increased rates. It is clearly against public policy to allow one to
insure himself against criminal liability, and punitive damages are
similar to a criminal fine. Finally, there is something unsavory
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about heaping punitive damages on the head of an insurer, who
is innocent of the original wrong.10 5
At least one court has attempted to explode the theory that pass-
ing punitive damages on to an insurer would not have any deterrent
effect on the insured, by pointing out that most insureds would
not be deterred by the threat to their pocketbook anyway.106 The
court noted that many criminal sanctions usually attach to an in-
sured's acts of willful misconduct and the fact that these have not
had the desired deterrent effect would tend to show that punitive
damages would not be effective either. On the other hand, it was
correctly pointed out that the idea of deterrence is good, even
though the means of effectuating it are less than satisfactory. More-
over, just because not all criminal statutes have been one hundred
percent effective crime deterrents is no reason to strike them from
the books.'
While the public policy argument rages, there seems to be unan-
imous judicial agreement that there is no similar problem where the
insured is liable for punitive damages only vicariously, such as
through the principal-agent relationship. Where a servant or agent
commits an act which would be ordinarily punishable by punitive
damages, the actual wrongdoer is not covered by the insurance.
Thus the recovery or denial of punitive damages against the insurer
would have no effect whatsoever on the wrongdoer. In such a case
there is no public policy against insurance for punitive damages, be-
cause the actual wrongdoer is not escaping punishment for his act
by passing it along to an insurance carrier.08
While this argument is cogent at first glance, it contains several
logical weaknesses. Where the corporation is liable through au-
thorization, ratification, or participation in the agent's acts, as in
Cedarville, the public policy argument is reinstated, because the cor-
poration is the actual wrongdoer. Where the corporation is held
liable only through the principle of respondeat superior, it is as-
sumed that an award of punitive damages will be translated into ef-
105 American Surety Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cit. 1966); Northwestern Cas.
Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962); American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F.
Supp. 257 (D. Conn. 1965); Nicholson v. American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52
(Fla. App. 1965); Cmll v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964); Esmond v. Liscio,
209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966).
106Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1
(1964).
10 7 American Surety Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cit. 1966).
10 8 Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Finance Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
295 U.S. 734 (1934); Sterling Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898 (Fla. App. 1966).
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fective action against the agent, either in the form of intra-corpor-
ate punishment or indirect action against the agent by the insurer.
Thus if an insurer has the tenacity to pursue recovery against the
agent, the ultimate burden is placed where it rightfully belongs -
on the wrongdoer. Finally, from a purely common-sense stand-
point, the argument is anomalous. An insurer, by its contract,
agrees to be bound for damages incurred by its insured. The in-
surer, then, assuming coverage under the policy, stands in the shoes
of its insured in any case instituted against the insured. When the
public policy-corporate argument is injected into the case, the courts
are in effect saying that the insurer is liable for the full extent of
the punitive award when its corporate insured is innocent of any
wrongful act, but is not liable if the corporate insured is guilty of
the wrongful act. To the layman, this result simply does not make
sense.
In states where public policy does not preclude the imposition of
a punitive award on the insurer, the ultimate question is whether or
not the policy covers an award of punitive damages.' 09 An anal-
ysis of court -decisions construing insurance coverage for punitive
damages in automobile and malpractice cases reveals that the major-
ity of courts have found that coverage exists. The language of the
policies in most cases, however, has covered all damages imposed
upon the insured by law. Thus, in a recent South Carolina deci-
sion,10 it was held that the insurer's undertaking to pay sums for
which the insured should "become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of... [b]odily injury," was broad enough to include
punitive damages. Presumably the rationale was that punitive dam-
ages were a legal obligation of the insured. Under identical contract
language a Tennessee court reached the same result and added the
reasoning that the average policyholder would expect to be covered
for all damages not intentionally inflicted."' In most cases where
109 The standard Protection and Indemnity (P & I) contract for American Under-
writers generally reads as follows:
The Association agrees to indemnify the Assured against any loss, damage,
or expense which the Assured shall become liable to pay and shall pay by
reason of the fact that the Assured is the owner ... of the insured vessel and
which shall result from the following liabilities, risks, events, occurrences and
expenditures.
A myriad of coverages and exclusions, including liability for personal injury or death
follows this general language.
110 Carroway v .Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965). See also Pennsyl-
vania Thresherman & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir.
1957).
111 Lazenby v.Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1
(1964).
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courts have found coverage for punitive damages the policy language
reflected a term for legal liability.112 On the other hand, some other
courts have construed identical language to exclude punitive dam-
ages,'1 3 and have usually advanced a public policy argument. At
least one court has held that there was no coverage under a policy
insuring against bodily injury and property damage sustained by any
person because punitive damages do not fall within that category." 4
It should be noted that the standard Protection and Indemnity
policy covers only sums which the assured shall "become liable to pay
and shall pay," and does not include the "legally obligated" or "liabil-
ity imposed by law" language. Since punitive damages are strictly a
creature of the law and are somewhat maligned in most circles, this
slight variation in language might be enough to oust coverage in
courts with strong public policy dispositions against punitive damage
coverage. The question of policy coverage is likely to be short-lived,
however, as most insurers will be swift to rewrite their policies either
to expressly exclude punitive damage liability or to accept it with a
corresponding adjustment in premium price.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of Cedarville the race to the deep pocket of the
solvent corporate defendant has already started. In Gunnip v.
Warner Co.," 5 the trial court allowed a Jones Act plaintiff to
amend his petition to include a claim for punitive damages. The
complaint originally charged that the defendant was negligent in
supplying the plaintiff with a rope which it knew to be rotten. The
court held that it was an open question whether punitive damages
could be recovered under the Jones Act and allowed the amendment
over defendant's objections that the amendment was "frivolous."
As authority for its stand, the trial court cited the Cedarville case.
It thus appears that the lower courts have taken another seven-
league stride across time-honored precedents, and have outstripped
landlocked courts in their zeal to punish the corporate defendant.
12 See cases cited notes 110 & 111 supra. See also Capital Motor Lines v. Loring,
238 Ala. 260, 189 So. 897 (1939); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Baker, 304 Ky. 296, 200 S.W.
2d 757 (1947); Morrell v. LaLonde, 45 R.I. 112, 120 A. 435, error dismissed, 264 U.S.
572 (1924) (malpractice insurance).
13 Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934); Tedesco
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d
17 (Mo. App. 1964).
114 Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964).
"15 1968 A.M.C. 957 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
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This trend can only be reversed if the appellate courts strictly ad-
here to the time-honored rules that a master in time of a crisis is in
complete control of his ship, he is not subject to corporate regula-
tion, and his acts at sea are not those of the corporation. While the
author is not suggesting that precedent alone is a sufficient reason
for adhering to an outdated rule, he is convinced that not even
modern-day radio and telephone communication - indeed not even
closed-circuit television - are capable of removing corporate of-
ficers from their armchairs and placing them on the bridge of a fog-
enshrouded ship at the height of the turmoil and confusion follow-
ing a major collision at sea. To remove the authority of a master
at that moment of crisis, and to place the lives and safety of the crew
and passengers in the hands of a corporate official hundreds of
miles from the scene, would break down every line of seagoing dis-
cipline which has grown up in the centuries of seafaring history. It
is this writer's hope that the courts will elect not to do so and will
dismiss Cedarville as one of those "hard cases that make bad law."
ADDENDUM
While this Comment was at press the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed -the district court' and held: (1) The district judge's
findings that United States Steel authorized and ratified Captain
Joppich's actions were clearly erroneous.' (2) A finding of ratifica-
tion or authorization was a prerequisite to awarding punitive dam-
ages against a ship's owner.' The court of appeals, applying the
clearly erroneous standard as construed in United States v. United
States Gypsum Co.,4 directed its reversal only at the district court's
finding of ratification and authorization and said that the corporate
officials were not obligated to decide "the best course. .. to be taken
or to countermand the orders of ,the master who was on the scene."'
The court of appeals did not rule on the district court's alternative
1 United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, No. 18481 (6th Cir. decided March 7, 1969).
21Id. at 5.
3 Id. at 9. The idea also follows from the Lake Shore case. See notes 19-25 supra
& accompanying text.
4333 U.S. 364 (1948).
5 United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, at 6. The court said that such control,
especially in emergencies, is imperative "[i)n order to avoid chaos . . . [and] avoid
hesitations and disastrous delays [by] the master while he obtains advice and authority
from his superiors ... " Id. at 6-7. The court recognized that an alternative ground
for punitive damages would be "if the acts complained of were those of an unfit master
and the owner was reckless in employing him." Id. at 9.
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holding that punitive damages could be awarded under the survival
portion of the Jones Act.6 The implication is that if punitive dam-
ages can be awarded under the Jones Act ratification or authorization
may still be prerequisites. The court, however, by avoiding the Jones
Act questions left the propriety of awarding punitive damages under
the Jones Act undecided.7
6 See note 60-73 supra & accompanying text. Thus the court also avoided deciding
whether or not a showing of conscious pain and suffering was a prerequisite to awarding
punitive damages under the Jones Act. See note 71-73 supra & accompanying text
7 There was some indication that the claimants were considering asking the Supreme
Court for certiorari. See Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 9, 1969, §AA, at 2, col. 3.
However, the probability of the Supreme Court granting certiorari would be greater
had the sixth circuit decision involved the construction of a federal statute.
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